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  The introduction of a centralized institution for trading production rights in quota-regulated 
agricultural sectors can dramatically improve the flow of information among market partici-
pants and increase efficiency. On the other hand, prevailing conditions in these small markets 
can provide sellers with a market advantage, yielding high quota prices that impose important 
financial costs on quota holders and limit the entry of new producers into the industry. In this 
paper, we modify the normal allocation rule of the k-double auction (kDA) to counter thin 
market conditions and to favor buyers who bid low prices. In laboratory experiments, we test 
the “truncated” kDA (T-kDA) against a regular kDA for its ability to affect buyer and seller 
behavior and decrease equilibrium prices, and assess how it impacts efficiency. The results 
show that the T-kDA significantly lowers the equilibrium price and results in moderate effi-
ciency losses. Most importantly, the T-kDA effectively counters the market power of oligo-
polists when demand far outstrips supply. 
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This paper reports on the design and experimental 
test of a modification to the allocation rule of the 
uniform price k-double auction (kDA) that we 
call the truncated k-double auction (T-kDA). This 
rule was developed in response to a request by 
members of the Federation of Québec Egg Pro-
ducers to develop a market-based trading mecha-
nism that systematically put a downward pressure 
on the price of tradable egg production quotas. 
  Our objectives are to introduce the allocation 
rule, experimentally investigate its impact on the 
behavior of buyers and sellers, and study how it 
affects the market-clearing price, quantities traded, 
and the efficiency of the k-double auction. 
  In a nutshell, the T-kDA implements a two-step 
allocation rule. In the first step, the equilibrium 
quantity and the identification of which units are 
to be sold are determined by the usual intersection 
of the suppliers’ offer curve and demanders’ bid 
curve. In the second step, the allocation to buyers 
is determined. This is where the T-kDA differs 
from the regular kDA. In the kDA, the units 
transacted are allocated starting from the highest 
bidder, successively working down the bid curve 
until the last unit (at the equilibrium quantity) is 
reached. In the T-kDA, all demanders who made 
bids equal to or above the price asked by the 
seller of the equilibrium unit are eligible to re-
ceive units. In contrast to the kDA, the allocation 
is done starting with the lowest of those bids and 
working up the buyer’s bid curve. 
  In effect, the T-kDA allocation rule is designed 
to provide strategic incentives for buyers to sub-
mit the lowest possible bids while remaining above 
or at the marginal offer price established at the 
intersection of the bid and offer curves. It is hy-
pothesized that this competition among buyers 
will create downward pressure on buyers’ bids 
and thus on equilibrium prices. 
  If effective, this rule may be particularly useful 
in situations characterized by oligopoly or where 
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there exists a substantial demand for a tightly 
constrained number of units offered for sale. This 
is precisely the type of conditions prevailing in 
several Canadian markets for tradable agricultural 
production quotas. Therefore, while this research 
is motivated by the design of a market mechanism 
for the trading of egg production permits in the 
province of Québec, the findings are equally ap-
plicable to milk or chicken quota systems in ef-
fect across Canada. The knowledge gained from 
our experiments also applies more generally to 
broader applications of the uniform price kDA 
and our understanding of this important family of 
auctions. 
  Our laboratory experiments show that, as hy-
pothesized, the T-kDA produces equilibrium prices 
that are on average 25 percent lower than under 
the regular kDA. This outcome is primarily the 
result of significantly lower buyer bids. 
  For egg producers in Québec, the T-kDA would 
likely represent an important improvement over 
the unstructured quota market currently in place, 
and might also achieve the desired effect of pro-
viding improved access to young producers who 
do not have unfettered access to financial markets. 
  However, lower prices are generally accompa-
nied by a reduction in the number of units traded 
and a significant increase in the misallocation of 
units to buyers who value them less than other 
excluded buyers. In our experiments, this results 
in an overall efficiency loss of approximately 15 
percent of the available surplus. Such losses 
should not be disregarded since the sub-optimal 
allocation of production quota under the T-kDA 
could have significant long-term negative impacts 
on the competitiveness of the industry. 
  We present and discuss these results in the 
Data and Results section. Before this, we provide 
a brief contextual description of the Québec egg 
industry and its production quota market, describe 
the T-kDA rules of allocation, and provide a de-
scription of the experimental design and research 
protocol. We conclude the paper with a discus-
sion and some final thoughts. 
 
Context—The Québec Egg Industry 
 
Numerous agricultural commodities are plagued 
by important upswings in prices, followed by 
periods of deeply depressed prices. In the egg 
production sector, the U.S. response to price vola-
tility (and processors’ market power) was the de-
velopment of a vertically integrated industry. In 
Canada a supply management regime was put in 
place, coupled with import restrictions. Accord-
ingly, Canadian egg producers are required by 
law to hold a production permit (quota) for each 
laying hen they own. The quota system strictly 
controls the expansion of the industry and creates 
an oligopoly that maintains higher egg prices and 
reduces price volatility. 
  The presence of oligopoly rents confers value 
to the individual transferable quota required for 
production. In a well-functioning quota market, 
we would expect the price of a unit of quota to 
reflect the rents it generates by equating the an-
nual rental cost (i.e., the financial cost or oppor-
tunity cost of holding permits) with the annual-
ized economic rents from production. However, 
the small size of the industry and the illiquid na-
ture of the physical infrastructure required to pro-
duce eggs (and other agricultural commodities 
where quotas are also required) likely make for a 
thin quota market, especially on the seller side. 
With few sellers and the demand for quota likely 
exceeding the supply available, it is believed that 
prevailing conditions in the egg industry (as well 
as in the milk and chicken sectors) provide sellers 
with a distinct advantage, yielding quota prices 
that are relatively high within the range of admis-
sible equilibrium prices. 
  High quota prices are a concern for Québec’s 
egg producers for two central reasons. First, large 
sums of money need to be capitalized into this 
non-productive asset (Boots, Lansink, and Peer-
ling 1997, Alvarez, Arias, and Orea 2006). In the 
province of Québec, there are approximately 103 
egg farms, each with an average of 36,000 laying 
hens. Hence, the capitalized value of the quota 
likely exceeds CA$800 million, or close to $8 mil-
lion per farm. 
  Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is 
a perception among producers that high quota 
prices are detrimental to the industry’s renewal. 
They make it difficult for young individuals to 
become producers, artificially favoring a concen-
tration of the industry into the hands of a few 
large agri-food corporations who can more easily 
access financial capital. This is slowly reducing 
the geographical distribution of producers across 
the province. While these trends may be desirable 
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and long-term competitiveness of the industry, cur-
rent producers and stakeholders view this issue 
quite differently. 
  Motivated by environmental and regional eco-
nomic development concerns, current producers 
have clearly expressed that one of their objectives 
is to maintain a producer-owner structure over a 
large territory. One interpretation of the situation 
is that existing quota holders—i.e., those who 
stand to lose the most from lowering quota 
prices—view the continuation of the current in-
dustry structure as a public good. Furthermore, 
they are collectively willing to accept lower quota 
prices (when they eventually sell their quota) in 
exchange for its provision. Unfortunately, this will-
ingness to provide a public good must inevitably 
confront the free-rider problem. 
  In Québec’s egg industry, the current lack of 
organized institutions for quota trading likely 
means that this collective good is not provided. 
Perhaps even worse, the existing approach to 
quota trading might also greatly exacerbate the 
impact of other market imperfections. In the last 
decade, a small number of input suppliers have 
become de facto quota brokers. Their regular con-
tact with a large fraction of egg producers puts 
them at a great advantage for identifying both 
potential buyers and sellers of quota among exist-
ing producers. They can also most easily identify 
potential new entrants who must necessarily plan 
their feed supply ahead of entering the industry. 
Feed suppliers have successfully capitalized on 
this informational advantage by purchasing much 
of the available quota and tying its resale to ex-
clusive long-term input contracts. This situation 
likely results in the systematic capture of informa-
tional rents by feed suppliers. It has also made the 
real quota price unobservable and allowed input 
suppliers to select buyers as they wish. Cumula-
tively, it is believed that the current system leaves 
input suppliers with a large portion of the indus-
try’s rents and undue influence over its future. 
  It is within this context that the Federation of 
Québec Egg Producers decided to create a cen-
tralized market institution for quota trading. The 
Federation’s wish is to implement a budget-bal-
anced market mechanism that avoids the need for 
administrative allocations of quota and the risk of 
creating perceptions of manipulation or favorit-
ism. The market mechanism would ideally foster 
efficient trading of a relatively low volume of 
units in a market characterized by a small number 
of sellers and demand that substantially outstrips 
supply. The Federation of Québec Egg Producers 
wishes to adopt a market rule that maintains 
downward pressure on the price as an indirect 
mechanism to favor the provision of its “industry 
structure public good.” 
 
The Auction Markets 
 
Doyon and Rondeau (2006) explored various poli-
cies and market designs that could potentially 
meet the objectives of Québec’s egg producers. 
Given that the market is expected to be populated 
by relatively few potential sellers at any given 
time, continuous trading was excluded for fear 
that situations would arise in which a single seller 
could exercise substantial market power and drive 
up the market price. This eliminates the continu-
ous double auction (Smith 1962, 1964, 1965, 
1976) and similar stock market trading mecha-
nisms from the set of options. More desirable is a 
call market in which buyers and sellers submit 
bids and asks over a certain period of time (poten-
tially weeks or even months) and until the market 
closes at a pre-announced time. At the market’s 
closure, a pre-determined price and allocation rule 
are applied. 
  Many different rules have been studied theo-
retically or experimentally (e.g., Smith et al. 1982, 
Van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster 1993, Davis 
and Williams 1997, Cason and Friedman 1999, 
Denton, Rassenti, and Smith 2001, Dubey and 
Shubik 1980). Incentive-compatible call market 
mechanisms based on a two-sided multiple unit 
Vickrey auction (e.g., Yoon 2001) are not guaran-
teed to be budget balanced and thus require that 
the market regulator have the power (and will) to 
tax sales or subsidize purchases. This was not 
possible for the Québec egg industry. 
  Institutions based on an open book were also 
eliminated. The open book is a feature in which 
all bids and asks submitted prior to the closing of 
the market are made public. While the infor-
mation from an open book might help equilibrate 
the market, it was rejected for the same thin mar-
ket reason invoked earlier, a decision reinforced 
by experimental evidence showing that the open 
book rule leads to more strategic bidding and 
lower rates of efficiency (Cason and Friedman 
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  One of the simplest mechanisms that could be 
modified to help deliver the Federation’s objec-
tives of an independent market that could keep in 
check the equilibrium price with a minimum loss 
of efficiency is called the “k-double auction.”
1 
 The  k-double auction (sometimes referred to as 
the “single price double auction”) is a simple uni-
form price call auction for a two-sided market. In 
this market, buyers submit sealed bids and sellers 
submit sealed asks that are then ordered to form 
the market’s revealed demand and supply sched-
ules respectively. The intersection of these sched-
ules determines the quantity traded and the mar-
ket price. If there is a difference between the 
asking price and the bid for the last unit traded 
(the prices at the intersection of the bid and ask 
schedules), the clearing price paid for all units 
traded is a weighted average (using a factor k ∈ 
[0,1]) of the two marginal prices. Following 
Friedman (1993), we implement a k=0.5 auction 
where the clearing price for all transactions is the 
average of the highest asking price resulting in a 
transaction and of the lowest demand bid result-
ing in a trade. 
  Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) show that 
the kDA is both incentive-compatible (i.e., trad-
ers’ incentives are to bid or ask their true reserva-
tion prices) and efficient (i.e., all potential gains 
from trade are realized) when the market is per-
fectly competitive and composed of an infinitely 
large number of small traders. This result relies 
only on the rationality of players and complete 
information about the distributions from which 
the reservation prices of buyers and sellers are 
drawn. Unfortunately, this is a limit result. In the 
absence of a very large number of players and 
competitive conditions, attempts at market mani-
pulations and the exercise of market power can-
not be excluded (Chatterjee and Jarrow 1998, 
Bower and Bunn 2001). 
  Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) do show, 
however, that the kDA is “worst-case asymptotic 
optimal,” meaning that among all market mecha-
nisms with rational players that can operate inde-
pendently of taxes or subsidies, the uniform price 
                                                                                    
1 Because allocation rules and procedures vary across papers and 
studies, care should be taken not to excessively generalize the meaning 
of these names. For instance, Cason and Friedman (1999) implement a 
k-double auction they name a “single price call market.” This mecha-
nism differs from their “uniform price double auction” only in that the 
second market mechanism makes use of an open book. Elsewhere, 
Friedman (1993) calls the call market the “clearinghouse” institution 
and implements three different book information treatments. 
kDA converges most rapidly to full efficiency as 
the number of players increases. Hence, the uni-
form price double auction has properties that 
make it a desirable market mechanism for field 
applications. Yet, most field conditions do not 
provide for perfect competition, and neither in-
centive-compatibility nor efficiency can be pre-
dicted or expected. 
 In  experimental  studies, call markets are gener-
ally slightly less efficient than the continuous 
double auction in which traders can make bilat-
eral contracts at any time during the trading pe-
riod. Whereas the continuous double auction 
regularly achieves allocative efficiency of 95 per-
cent or more, variants of the kDA are more likely 
to achieve efficiency levels in the 85 percent to 
95 percent range (Friedman 1993, Cason and 
Friedman 1999). Yet in some cases the two 
mechanisms performed equally well (Davis and 
Williams 1997). It also appears that the gap be-
tween the two families of auctions becomes smaller 
with increased trader experience. 
  The experimental literature consistently reports 
how modifications to auction rules affect the be-
havior of market participants and equilibrium out-
comes. Cason and Plott (1996) compare the rules 
of a market for SO2 emission permits proposed by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to a standard kDA. Under EPA rules, buyers’ bids 
were ranked from highest to lowest, and sellers’ 
asks from lowest to highest. The lowest ask was 
matched with the highest bid and the transaction 
price set at the bid price. Since a successful buyer 
paid the amount he bid (a discriminatory rather 
than uniform price kDA), the EPA auction rules 
created an incentive for buyers to misrepresent 
their true value. Cason and Plott found that the 
EPA rules significantly reduced the average 
price and decreased market efficiency by up to 6 
percent. 
  It is worth pointing out that concerns over high 
prices in centralized auctions are not unique to 
Québec’s agricultural sector. They are especially 
strong in the U.S. electricity market where a uni-
form price (here in single-sided supply auctions) 
leads consumers to pay peak prices based on high 
marginal producer costs, even for the electricity 
produced at the same time by cheap baseload sup-
pliers (Cramton and Stoft 2007). For this situa-
tion, Vossler et al. (2009) explore whether modi-
fying a single-sided uniform price auction can 
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tion of a “soft cap” with a uniform pricing rule. 
They conclude from their experimental investiga-
tion that the soft cap is unable to lower prices. 
  In a study methodologically closer to ours, 
Doyon et al. (2008) evaluate the impact of modi-
fying the kDA employed for the trading of dairy 
quota in Canada. Once again, the principal impe-
tus for the modifications tested by Doyon et al. 
was to create downward pressure on prices. They 
test three different alternatives: (i) a tax on units 
offered but not sold, (ii) outright exclusion of the 
highest bids and offers from the bid and ask 
schedules, and (iii) a combination of the two 
rules. Experimental results show that a tax sig-
nificantly reduces the number of units offered and 
the efficiency of the market without significantly 
reducing the market price. While the exclusion of 
highest-priced bids and asks slightly decreased 
the equilibrium price, it also significantly de-
creased the number of exchanges (and economic 
efficiency). The principal disadvantage of this rule 
is that, by construction, some tradable units are 
always necessarily excluded from the final alloca-
tion, making it impossible for the mechanism to 
achieve 100 percent efficiency. Combining the 
two rules did not improve results. 
  The truncation rule tested in this paper is an 
alternative price determination and quantity allo-
cation procedure that modifies the normal rules of 
the uniform price kDA. While we have outlined 
the rule in the introduction, greater details and an 
example are now provided. 
  Under the T-kDA, both buyers and sellers are 
invited to submit bids and asks consisting of (i) 
the number of units they wish to buy or sell, and 
(ii) the price at which they are prepared to buy or 
sell. While multiple units are involved, a restric-
tion is imposed that participants can only submit a 
single bid or ask (participants can freely choose 
the number of units but must select a single 
price). This restriction limits the ability of partici-
pants to directly influence the equilibrium price 
with a series of bids or asks each with small quan-
tities at various prices, a possibility that could lead 
to extensive strategic behavior (Wilson 1979, 
Back and Zender 1993, Khrisna 2002).
2 Once the 
                                                                                    
2 Allowing multiple bids or asks creates low-cost incentives to at-
tempt manipulations of the market. To see this, think of a large seller 
seeking to obtain the largest possible price on as many units as pos-
sible when multiple asks can be entered. One strategy might be to offer 
a large number of units at a relatively low price, and a series of single  
bids and asks are ordered in the way of typical 
supply and demand curves, the intersection of the 
bid and ask curves determines the quantity sup-
plied to the market. In a standard kDA, the units 
to be sold are those starting with the lowest ask-
ing price on the supply curve, moving sequen-
tially up to the intersection of the bid and ask 
functions. This rule remains unchanged in the T-
kDA. 
  The T-kDA modifies which buyers get to pur-
chase those units (and at what price). Whereas a 
standard kDA simply allocates the units in de-
creasing order of bid price, the T-kDA favors 
bidders with low bids first. Bidders are declared 
eligible to purchase some of the traded units as 
long as their bid price is equal to or greater than 
the price asked by the seller of last transacted unit 
(the unit at the intersection of the bid and ask 
curves). In a reversal of normal rules, the units 
are then sold in priority to bidders who submitted 
the lowest (rather than the highest) price bids.
3 
  Another way of looking at the allocation rule is 
that it implements a leftward shift of the bid curve 
whenever demanded units to the right of the sup-
ply-demand intersection have a bid price that ex-
ceeds the asking price at the equilibrium quantity. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the truncation rule and its 
potential impacts on the equilibrium allocation. 
The solid lines represent examples of ordered 
buyer bids and seller asks hypothetically submit-
ted by market participants. Ignoring the dashed 
lines momentarily, the intersection of the supply 
and demand curves determines that 50 units will 
be traded. This is true whether the kDA or T-kDA 
rules were applied to these bid and ask curves. 
Under the standard kDA, all units to the left of 
the intersection are traded. Buyers A through D 
                                                                                    
unit offers each at $1 more than the previous one. Each of those higher 
price offers has some positive probability of being the marginal ask, 
and therefore of increasing the uniform clearing price of the auction. 
Such a strategy comes at a relatively small expected cost (higher priced 
single unit offers may not sell), but potentially very large benefits since 
the price of all units sold will then be higher. 
3 We have also implemented identical tie-breaking rules in the kDA 
and T-kDA. For given bid and ask schedules, these rules do not modify 
the equilibrium price and quantities, but determine which participant 
gets to sell (buy) units when two or more sellers (buyers) have sub-
mitted asks (bids) at the same price and it is not possible to meet all 
orders at that price. The tie-breaking rule that we apply universally to 
both buyers and sellers gives priority to the smallest quantity submit-
ted. This simply increases the likelihood that at least one order in the 
tie will be fully traded. If the offers are identical with respect to both 
the price and quantity submitted, the order fulfilled first is chosen ran-






















































Figure 1. Truncation Rule—An Example 
 
 
would see their entire orders fulfilled and buyer E 
would receive only a fraction of his order. The 
equilibrium price under the kDA would be set at 
the halfway point between the marginal de-
manded and supplied units, yielding a transaction 
price of 585 Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
  If the same bids and asks were submitted in the 
T-kDA, however, the outcome would be differ-
ent. The asking price of the last unit to be sold is 
350 ECU. Inspection of the bid curve reveals that 
all buyers from A to G inclusively made bids 
above 350 and are therefore qualified to purchase 
units. Only Buyer H is automatically excluded. 
The allocation to buyers is made starting with 
Buyer G (the lowest qualifying price) and moving 
sequentially to F, E, D, up to and ending with 
Buyer C, who, in this example, obtains his full 
order. Effectively, the allocation results from 
shifting the bid curve to the left (the downward-
sloping dashed curve in Figure 1) up to the lowest 
possible point of intersection that maintains a 
total of 50 units being traded. With k=0.5, the 
uniform clearing price would be 415 ECU, half-
way between the asking price and bidding price at 
the intersection of the supply and shifted demand 
schedules. 
  It is worth pointing out that for given bid and 
ask schedules, the T-kDA and standard kDA rules 
yield identical results whenever extra-marginal 
bids (units on the demand schedule to the right of 
the intersection) are below the asking price of the 
last unit sold. Thus, if the T-kDA rule did not 
modify the bids and asks made by market partici-
pants (as we expect it should), it would either 
leave the equilibrium price unchanged, or it would 
lower it when the configuration of the bid and ask 
schedules triggered the shift in the revealed 
demand curve. 
  However, as with the exclusion rule tested in 
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to create strategic incentives for buyers to lower 
their bids by creating greater competition among 
them and favoring low-price bidders. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to develop a for-
mal Bayesian game-theoretic prediction for the T-
kDA, a description of the fundamental incentives, 
and a comparison of how those might play out in 
the basic and truncated auctions with thin mar-
kets, is useful. 
  From a particular starting point (a useful one 
might be one’s true value for the good), consider 
the costs and benefits to a buyer of marginally de-
creasing his bidding price ex ante. In the normal 
kDA, decreasing the bidding price lowers the ex-
pected transaction price on all units since it either 
makes no difference to the transaction price if this 
trader’s bid is not pivotal, or it lowers it if the bid 
is pivotal. Hence, there is a clear expected benefit 
for a buyer to decrease his bid. On the other hand, 
there is a cost. A buyer who lowers his bid in-
creases the probability that he will find himself 
outside of the market and obtain no unit. Thus, 
the optimal bid must balance the positive incen-
tives of a lower expected clearing price against 
the increased probability of being excluded from 
the market. 
  In contrast, consider the bidder’s incentives un-
der the truncation rule. As before, lowering one’s 
price increases the probability that it will become 
the marginal price. But given that there are now 
more buyers who are in contention for the allo-
cation, and that these additional buyers all have 
lower reservation prices than the initial group, de-
creasing one’s bid has a smaller expected impact 
on the clearing price than in the regular kDA 
auction. From this perspective, there is therefore 
less of an incentive to lower one’s bid than in the 
standard kDA. However, a lower bid no longer 
has the unambiguous effect of decreasing the prob-
ability of obtaining units. Those who bid highest 
now run a serious risk of being left out of the al-
location. This comment generalizes to all players, 
since they do not know with certainty the actual 
distributions of reservation prices. Thus, while 
traders in the kDA need to worry only about bid-
ding too low, those in the T-kDA may fail to 
obtain units if they bid either too low or too high. 
Thus, on this side of the equation, there is a 
greater incentive for bidders to lower their bid in 
the T-kDA than in the kDA. 
  Strictly speaking, whether the net effect of 
passing from the kDA to the T-kDA is to de-
crease or increase buyers’ bids is therefore am-
biguous. However, it is worth remembering that 
everything else constant, introducing the trunca-
tion rule increases the number of buyers who 
have a chance at obtaining units. As such, this in-
creases the competition for the existing supply. 
Since the allocation rule gives priority to high 
price bids in the kDA and low price bids in the T-
kDA, we hypothesize that the sum of incentives 
goes in the direction of lower buyer bids in the T-
kDA. 
  It should be obvious that the T-kDA is not in-
centive-compatible regardless of the size of the 
market. A high-value buyer, for example, would 
never have a dominant strategy to bid his own 
value. But this is precisely the point of the trun-
cation rule. Existing quota holders in Québec’s 
egg industry wish to force the indirect provision 
of a public good through a decrease in the price 
of quota. 
  Unfortunately, the T-kDA rules could have 
negative effects on the efficiency of the market. 
Efficiency losses will occur whenever the alloca-
tion of traded units is incorrect in the sense that 
bidders who value the units the most are excluded 
from transacting while others with lower value of 
the units purchase them. Such risks are present in 
all forms of market institutions, but might be ex-
acerbated by the T-kDA rules. High-value buyers 
with incentives to lower their bid might collec-
tively demand units at prices too low and exclude 
themselves from the market. The overall number 
of units traded would then be lower than the wel-
fare-maximizing number. By the same token, 
units could be allocated to bidders who value 
them less than others. For these reasons, we ex-
pect the T-kDA to be less efficient than the stan-
dard kDA auction. At a minimum, we hope that 
the T-kDA will generate greater efficiency than 
the tax and exclusion treatments tested by Doyon 
et al. (2008). 
 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
Two sets of experiments were conducted to com-
pare the impact of the T-kDA against the standard 
uniform price kDA. The underlying market envi-
ronments were identical across all experiments. 
  The market was made up of seven buyers and 
five sellers who kept the same role for a total of 200    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
thirty periods of play.
4 At the beginning of each 
period, sellers were given a number of units they 
could sell, and a uniform cost of producing each 
unit if it was successfully sold. Buyers were told 
that they could attempt to buy up to a specified 
number of units and that each unit they success-
fully purchased would yield a given amount of 
currency (i.e., a constant resale value). 
  Subjects could visually determine that there 
were twelve participants, but were not told how 
many were buyers or sellers. All information on 
quantities and reserve prices (induced values) was 
private and confidential. 
  In each period, a subject’s task was to submit a 
bid or ask containing two pieces of information: 
(i) the number of units offered (seller) or sought 
(buyer), and (ii) the price at which he is prepared 
to transact (maximum willingness to pay for buy-
ers and minimum willingness to accept for sell-
ers). The information was aggregated and the out-
come of the market computed. At the end of each 
period, each individual was privately given the 
number of units he or she transacted, the market-
clearing price, and the resulting level of indivi-
dual profit. 
  The first six periods of the experiment were 
unpaid practice rounds. Each of these periods im-
plemented different vectors of market parameters 
(individual quantities and reserve prices), allow-
ing participants to familiarize themselves with 
their task, the computer interface, and the impact 
of their decisions. 
  The experiment then proceeded with 24 paid 
trading periods, divided in three sets of eight. 
During each set, the same vector of market pa-
rameters were kept, but the quantity and induced 
value that a participant was given changed with 
each new period. This was done to prevent par-
ticipants from settling into particular patterns of 
behavior premised on a simple repetition of pre-
vious rounds, yet it maintained the overall market 
structure to facilitate data analysis and compari-
sons over time and across treatments. 
                                                                                    
4 The number of buyers and sellers in our experiments was chosen 
primarily to reflect the egg industry’s anticipated market conditions for 
the quota market. While the literature recognizes that as few as four 
traders on each side of the market can deliver what looks like compe-
titive results, it is also noted that broad gaps between supply and de-
mand can favor one side of the market (Smith 1962, Kagel and Roth 
1995, Doyon 2001). It was most relevant for this study to create condi-
tions favorable to the development of market power through supply 
and demand schedules rather than through group size. 
  We label the three different configurations of 
the market as Models A, B, and C, respectively. 
They are summarized by the three panels of Fig-
ure 2, and in Table 1. 
  The different models introduce variations in the 
relative position of the demand and supply func-
tions. The models were created with stakeholders’ 
input and were extensively pretested in the lab. 
Two main features strongly influenced the design 
as they were deemed very likely to be representa-
tive of the Québec egg quota market: (i) the num-
ber of buyers should exceed the number of sell-
ers, and (ii) it was generally anticipated that the 
underlying demand for quota would exceed sup-
ply, potentially creating a large spread at the in-
tersection of the demand and supply curves. 
These two conditions are favorable to sellers, who, 
even under an efficient equilibrium might be in a 
position to capture a large portion of the gains 
from trade by pushing the price closer to the up-
per boundary of the competitive equilibrium price 
interval [see Smith (1962) for results of this kind 
in the continuous double auction]. 
  This led to the creation of Model B, with 5 
buyers and 7 sellers. The large vertical distance 
between the demand and supply curves and the 
excess demand leaves a substantial amount of 
room for the T-kDA allocation rule to generate 
intense competition between all buyers and put-
ting downward pressure on the equilibrium price. 
As such, Model B should provide insights into 
the ability of the T-kDA to contain seller power 
in a supply-constrained market. A failure of the 
T-kDA under these most favorable circumstances 
should raise serious doubt about the desirability 
of adopting such a mechanism. The addition of 
Models A and C was motivated by the uncertainty 
surrounding the extent of the spread between de-
mand and supply. For this reason, but also to bet-
ter gauge the effectiveness of the T-kDA, it was 
deemed necessary to test the mechanism in tighter 
markets as well. Model A was constructed to re-
present a fairly tight market, while Model C re-
presents an intermediate case. In these market 
conditions, it should be more difficult for both the 
kDA and T-kDA to achieve high efficiency levels. 
  The experiments were implemented using z-
tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted at the 
CIRANO laboratory for experimental economics 
in Montréal, Canada. Subjects were university stu-














Figure 2. Induced Demand and Supply Models (cont’d.) 
 
 
tations using the laboratory’s standing list of stu-
dent volunteers. Though some subjects had likely 
participated in economic experiments in the past, 
none were allowed to attend more than one of our 
own sessions. 
  Individuals arrived at the laboratory and were 
randomly seated at a station protected by privacy 
screens (hence randomly assigned to their role of 
buyer or seller), before reading and signing con-
sent forms. They then received oral explanations 
and instructions. They were given the opportunity 
to ask questions in private, which were relayed to 
the entire group and answered publicly only if 
they concerned general understanding and clarifi-
cations (questions of strategy or revealing private 
information were neither shared nor answered). 
Participants’ experimental earnings were paid at 
an exchange rate of CA$15 per 100,000 experi-
mental currency units (ECU). They earned be-
tween $18 and $50 (including a $5 show-up fee) 
for a session that lasted approximately 90 minutes. 
Data and Results 
 
In total, we report the data from 10 sessions of the 
normal uniform price kDA and 11 sessions of the 
T-kDA. We analyze the data from Model A for 
all 21 sessions. In all sessions, Model A was the 
first one presented to participants. A minor pro-
gramming error resulted in a small allocation er-
ror in about 20 percent of the periods of Models 
B and C. Thus, we restrict our analysis of behav-
ior under these market conditions to three ses-
sions for each of the two auction modes.
5 Table 2 
                                                                                    
5 The programming error resulted in one of the buyers (not always the 
same individual) purchasing one fewer unit than the auction rules actu-
ally called for, and only on some occasions. We have separately ana-
lyzed the data from the affected sessions and find no qualitative differ-
ences in the behavior of participants. However, the slight misallocation 
makes efficiency calculations inaccurate. Thus, while there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the programming error was perceived by partici-
pants (consciously or not), we simply err on the side of caution and 
leave all of the affected data out of this paper. Doyon, Rondeau, and Mbala  Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction   203 
 
 
Table 1. Experimental Parameters 
MODEL A         
Buyers         
  Value  4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,800 1,300 
  Quantity  15 10  5 15 10 15 10 
S e l l e r s          
  Value  100  700 1,400 1,700 2,100     
  Quantity  20 15 10  5 20    
Competitive equilibrium  Quantity: 50     Price: [1,700, 2,000] 
MODEL B         
B u y e r s          
  Value  2,600 2,400 2,260 2,100 1,920 1,760 1,300 
  Quantity  15  5 10 10 15  5 10 
S e l l e r s          
  Value  100 150 300 300 400     
  Quantity  10  5  5 10 10    
Competitive equilibrium  Quantity: 40     Price: [400, 2,100] 
MODEL C         
Buyers         
  Value  1,500 1,300 1,160 1,000  820  700  480 
  Quantity  15  5 10 15 10  5 10 
Sellers         
  Value  100 200 250 350 350    
  Quantity  10 15  5 10 10    
Competitive equilibrium  Quantity: 50     Price: [350, 820] 
 
 
Table 2. Number of Participants and Number of Individual Observations (decisions) by Model  
  Model A  Model B  Model C  Total 
Unique buyers/sellers kDA   70/50  21/15  21/15  182/130 
Unique buyers/sellers T-kDA  77/55  21/15  21/15  119/85 
Total unique buyers/sellers  147/105  42/30  42/30  301/215 
Number of bids/asks kDA  560/400  168/120  168/120  1,456/1,040 
Number of bids/asks T-kDA  616/440  168/120  168/120  952/680 
Total bids/asks  1,176/840  336/240  336/240  2,408/1,720 
 
 
summarizes the number of observations underly-
ing the analysis. 
  The analysis proceeds first by presenting over-
all market outcomes before delving into how the 
underlying behavior of buyers and sellers is af-
fected by the T-kDA market rule. Our approach 
follows first and foremost Savage’s “interocular 
trauma test.” While we report test statistics, they, 
for the most part, only confirm what can be read-
ily observed graphically. The reality is that the 204    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
data does not test as being drawn from normal 
distributions and, in many cases, neither are the 
distributions symmetrical. In addition, we pool the 
data from each model (across periods), almost cer-
tainly violating the usual assumption that obser-
vations are independent. For these reasons, most 
statistical tests are, in some way, potentially bi-
ased. Yet, the high degree to which most hypo-
theses of equality are rejected should leave little 
doubt as to the existence, direction, and statistical 
significance of the effects observed. 
  As a guide to the strength of the differences, 
we report in the text the p-value for Mood’s χ
2 
test on medians. This is a simple test to determine 
whether observations from two samples are 
equally likely to be below or above the median of 
the two samples combined. This non-parametric 
test requires no assumption about the underlying 
distributions. When we discuss means, we offer 
as a rough guide the least favorable of the test-
statistics derived from standard tests (t-test, 
Welch test, F-test, Mann-Whitney). For the rea-
sons mentioned above, we caution the reader to 




RESULT 1. The uniform transaction price under the 
T-kDA allocation rule is significantly lower than 
under the kDA rule. 
 
  Result 1 confirms the central hypothesis of the 
paper: the T-kDA puts a significant downward 
pressure on transaction prices. The summary sta-
tistics by model are presented in Table 3, while 
Figure 3 presents the results visually for the mean 
transaction price per period for both treatments. 
In addition to the mean transaction price for each 
period, Figure 3 includes three horizontal lines 
for each model. As benchmarks, they indicate the 
minimum, maximum, and mid range of the inter-
val of prices that are consistent with efficient 
market-clearing. 
  For each of the models, the average price in the 
truncated auctions is lower than in the kDA by a 
significant margin. In model A, the decrease in 
price is slightly less than 10 percent, whereas for 
Models B and C the decrease is respectively 51 
percent and 36 percent. Statistical analysis of the 
data confirms these casual observations. The weak-
est of the Mood tests comparing the medians of 
the two auction modes is obtained from Model A, 
with a p-value p<0.0006. For the means, the 
weakest test is also for Model A, where the 
probability that the means are equal is p< 0.0003. 
The variance in the equilibrium price across treat-
ment is significantly different for Model A and 
for Model B, but not so (p=0.69) for Model C. 
This, we speculate, is the result of different fac-
tors, including learning over time and the large 
band of theoretically admissible equilibrium prices 
in Model B compared to Models A and C. 
  It is worthwhile to discuss the results of Model 
B in greater detail. Model B is the economy 
where the gap between demand values and supply 
costs is greatest, and where supply is most se-
verely constrained relative to demand. Consistent 
with the early findings of Smith (1962) using box-
designs and a continuous double auction, the kDA 
data under these conditions show clearly how 
such market conditions favor sellers. Indeed, for 
Model B (and C to a lesser extent), transaction 
prices are significantly greater than the mid-range 
of the theoretical market-clearing price. More-
over, the average clearing price of Model B 
(1,554) is much closer to the willingness to pay of 
the marginal buyer (1,920) than to the reserve 
price of the marginal seller (400). This conveys 
that in this stressful environment, sellers can 
command a disproportionate share of the surplus. 
The T-kDA, on the other hand, successfully re-
strains sellers’ ability to capture those profits. The 
average equilibrium price falls to 758. 
  Overall, these results establish the ability of the 
T-kDA to lower equilibrium prices, and to do so 
effectively when market conditions otherwise 
strongly favor sellers. 
 
Number of Units Traded 
 
The formal testable hypothesis that we explore in 
this section is that the number of units traded un-
der the two market rules are equal across treat-
ments, irrespective of the underlying economic 
conditions. This is a necessary condition—though 
not a sufficient one—for achieving allocative ef-
ficiency. Unfortunately, it is not entirely borne 
out by the data. 
 
RESULT 2. The T-kDA allocation rule results in a 
weakly smaller number of trades than the kDA. 
 
  Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for 
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Table 3. Mean Equilibrium Transaction Price (aggregated by model) 
  Model A  Model B  Model C 
 kDA  T-kDA  kDA  T-kDA kDA  T-kDA 
  Mean  1,831.28  1,655.16  1,554.33  757.92 721.46 460.90 
  Median  1,800.25  1,700.25  1,562.50  704.75 702.50 472.75 
  Max.  2,375.00  2,300.00 1,725.00 1,149.50  900.00  676.00 
  Min.  1,200.50  700.00  1,350.00  512.50 575.00 337.50 
  Std.  Dev.  214.44 369.71  108.07  206.52 89.18 80.92 
 Obs.  80  88  24  24  24  24 






Figure 3. Mean Equilibrium Transaction Price (per period and per model) 
Note: Periods 1 to 8 (Model A), periods 9 to 16 (Model B), and periods 17 to 24 (Model C). 
 
 
the model economies. Figure 4 shows the evolu-
tion of the mean number of trades for each pe-
riod. As a benchmark, the number of units that 
would be traded in an efficient allocation is 50 for 
models A and C, and 40 for Model B. 
  While the actual number of trades is generally 
lower under the T-kDA than the kDA, the differ-
ence is not large in absolute terms and not always 
statistically significant. Overall, 4 percent fewer 
units are traded under the T-kDA. This difference 
is not systematic and is statistically weak. The 
Mood tests on medians produce probabilities of 
equality p<0.13, p<0.001, and p<0.085. Thus, 
the number of units traded is only significantly 
less in the economy of Model B. The (potentially 
biased) t-tests on the means yield p-values of 
0.007, 0.003, and 0.079 for Models A, B, and C, 
respectively. 
  While it is encouraging to see that the differ-
ence in the number of units is small and not al- 206    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Mean Number of Units Traded (aggregated by model) 
  Model A  Model B  Model C 
 kDA  T-kDA  kDA  T-kDA kDA  T-kDA 
  Mean  43.30  41.00  39.40 37.90 45.80  42.80 
  Median  45.00  43.00  40.00 38.00 49.50  45.00 
  Max.  50.00  50.00  40.00 40.00 50.00  50.00 
  Min.  25.00  17.00  35.00 34.00 25.00  32.00 
 Std. Dev.  4.98  5.84  1.47  1.94  6.21  5.35 
 Obs.  80  88  24  24  24  24 





Figure 4. Mean Number of Units Traded (per period and per model) 
Note: Periods 1 to 8 (Model A), periods 9 to 16 (Model B), and periods 17 to 24 (Model C). 
 
 
ways statistically significant, the largest p-value 
is 0.13, only barely outside the bounds of safe re-
jection of the equality hypothesis. Since the num-
ber of units traded is also almost always lower, it 
seems prudent to conclude that the T-kDA has a 
weak tendency to lower the number of trades in 
the market. 
  Note that neither the kDA nor the T-kDA is 
clearly successful at delivering all of the units that 
should ideally be traded if all the gains from trade 
were seized. Early in the experimental sessions 
(Model A), participants managed to trade fewer 
than 80 percent of units predicted to trade. This 
percentage increases over time, but a significant 
number of trades remain unexecuted even in the 
last periods. The exception is model B, where 98 
percent of trades take place under the kDA and 
95 percent under the T-kDA. Once again, much 
of this can probably be attributed to the large 
spread between the demand and supply functions. 
  The somewhat weakened ability of the T-kDA 
to deliver all the welfare-enhancing trades should 
raise concerns for the efficiency performance of 





The results presented up to this point indicate that 
the T-kDA sufficiently alters the incentives of 
market participants to have a marked effect on the 
equilibrium (especially the price) of the traded 
commodity. To the extent that, collectively, lower 
prices are seen as a positive outcome to perpetu-
ate the current structure of the Québec egg indus-
try, this result can be viewed as a benefit by ex-
isting egg quota holders whose quota value would 
be lowered by the introduction of the T-kDA. 
  The potential to reduce the number of units 
traded, on the other hand, should be seen as a po-
tential cost associated with this mechanism. Fail-
ing to trade units almost always implies that op-
portunities to reallocate quota from those who 
value it less to others who value it more are 
missed. This negative aspect of the T-kDA will 
have repercussions on the level of efficiency at-
tained by the mechanism. 
  As is common in the experimental mechanism 
design literature, we measure efficiency as the 
proportion of the maximum possible gains from 
trade that are actually captured by market partici-
pants. The central result from our experiments is 
summarized by the following statement: 
 
RESULT 3. For the experimental conditions imple-
mented in this study, the T-kDA captures signifi-
cantly less of the potential gains from trade than 
the kDA. 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the results. 
  If subjects in our experiments had been 100 
percent efficient at capturing all of the possible 
gains from trade, they could have captured 
12,963,200 ECUs in the kDA, and 13,943,200 
ECUs in the truncated auctions (the difference is 
due exclusively to the different number of ses-
sions run with the two mechanisms). In reality, 
 
 
Table 5. Percentage of the Total Available 
Surplus Captured, Aggregated by Model 
 kDA  T-kDA 
Model A  88.8%  76.1% 
Model B  97.1%  77.9% 
Model C  93.3%  74.3% 
Total 91.3%  76.1% 
participants in the experiments managed to cap-
ture 90.6 percent of the possible gains from trade 
in the standard kDA, and 76.1 percent in the T-
kDA. Thus, in our experiments, the kDA resulted 
in a loss of efficiency of approximately 15 per-
centage points. This varies somewhat across the 
three models of the economy. In the kDA, the ef-
ficiency varies from 89 percent to 97 percent, 
while it varies from 74 percent to 78 percent in 
the truncated auction. 
  Two factors contribute to the loss of efficiency. 
The first, already noted, is the loss associated 
with the sub-optimal number of units traded. 
Each unit that goes untraded necessarily implies a 
loss of efficiency. The second factor that might be 
particularly problematic for the T-kDA is the 
“misallocation” of units to extra-marginal buyers 
and sellers. When a unit that comes from the right 
side of the equilibrium crossing of the induced 
supply and demand curves is traded, it is misallo-
cated in that a perfectly efficient allocation of the 
quota would not trade this unit. Therefore, a mar-
ket mechanism that favors such exchanges runs a 
risk of being inefficient. The T-kDA is particu-
larly vulnerable to this since, by construction, the 
allocation rule explicitly gives priority to holders 
of extra-marginal units (albeit in the vector of 
submitted bids and asks rather than induced val-
ues). This explicitly gives a chance to participants 
with extra marginal buyer values to displace 
higher-value demanders. This effect of the trun-
cation rule can be attenuated only if high-value 
buyers systematically place the lowest of the ad-
missible bids. The difficulty that arises, of course, 
is that with this strategic incentive to bid low 
comes the risk of being left out of the market en-
tirely. Hence the hypothesis and result: 
 
RESULT 4. Units defined as extra-marginal based 
on the underlying distributions of reserve prices 
are more likely to be traded in the T-kDA auction 
and contribute significantly to lowering the effi-
ciency of the market rule. 
 
  In our dataset, we identified whether a unit is 
extra-marginal based on the induced demand and 
supply curves. It is then possible to identify the 
number and proportion of transactions that in-
volve such units. For the regular kDA, and across 
all models, merely 1.05 percent of the 5,507 units 
exchanged in our experiments were extra-mar-
ginal on the demand side. In contrast, this pro-208    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
portion climbs to 10.3 percent of the 5,542 units 
traded under the T-kDA. This tenfold increase in 
the transaction of extra-marginal units appears to 
be the principal weakness of the T-kDA. The rule 
provides significant opportunities for less effi-
cient buyers to purchase units and contributes to 




We conclude the analysis of results with a brief 
description of the impact of the allocation rule at 
the individual level. We look, in turn, at the bids 
of buyers and offers of sellers in an effort to un-
derstand the channels giving rise to the market 




The central idea behind the truncation rule was to 
generate downward price competition among 
buyers. Since the equilibrium price is indeed 
lower under the T-kDA, it is worth verifying 
whether these incentives have in fact affected the 
price submitted by buyers. 
 
RESULT 5. Buyers submit significantly lower bids 
under the T-kDA than under the kDA. 
 
  We converted buyer bids to express them as a 
ratio of their induced value. The result is a nor-
malized measure—ranging from 0 to 1.3 (meas-
ures above 1 must be bidding errors but there are 
only a small number of ratios above 1), which we 
present in Table 6 and Figure 5. 
  Table 6 clearly demonstrates a sharp and sys-
tematic difference between the bidding prices of 
participants across treatments. Buyers submit prices 
that are on average 88 percent of their true value 
in the kDA compared to 72 percent in the T-kDA. 
All means and medians from the T-kDA are sub-
stantially lower than the comparable measure in 
the kDA. These differences are universally highly 
significant in all parametric and non-parametric 
tests performed. In particular, the Mood test pro-
duces p values smaller than 0.0001 for all three 
models. With the exception of Model A, the vari-
ance of the T-kDA price is also significantly 
greater, making the overall distributions of prices 
both shifted down and much flatter under the T-
kDA. 
  Figure 5 further illustrates the impact of the 
auction rule in different models. It presents the 
average of the bid to value ratio for each of the 24 
periods. The patterns observed are consistent with 
the result that the T-kDA has the greatest impact 
when there exists excess demand (Models B and 
C) and when there is a wider interval of efficient 
equilibrium prices (Model B). Of the two condi-
tions, it would appear that the excess demand is a 
more important factor since buyers continue to 
substantially shave their bids in Model C, where 
there continues to be excess demand, but where 
the gap in the reserve price is smaller than in 
Model B. These observations are necessarily 
speculative at this point. Greater variation in un-
derlying parameters, and controlling for possible 
order effects, would seem necessary in order to 
parse out the importance of each component. One 
thing is very clear, however: buyers respond to the 




As we did for buyers, we employ the quotient of 
bid price to reserve price to explore the behavior 
of sellers. Here, the results are mixed. Table 7 
and Figure 6 document the differences in mean 
markup by sellers. Statistical tests on the means 
indicate that the markup by sellers is significantly 
lower in the T-kDA only for Model B. However, 
Mood’s median test reveals otherwise (p=0.031). 
Qualitatively, it is notable that asking prices in 
the kDAs with Model B are the most volatile data 
from our experiments. This is undoubtedly attrib-
utable to the large gap between demand and sup-
ply prices at the theoretical equilibrium, and the 
opportunity for sellers to search for greater prof-
its. In contrast, the T-kDA produced much less 
volatility in this imperfect market, a result that 
could be seen as an additional benefit in agricul-
tural quota markets. The counterpart to this is 
Model C, in which visual inspection and tests on 
means do not reveal a difference, but where the 
median asking prices are statistically different 
across the two auctions. 
  It is notable that the T-kDA mechanism can 
lead sellers to lower their asking price (at least 
some of the time) since the only direct effect of 
modifying the auction’s incentive is on buyers. 
This might reinforce the ability of the truncation 
rule to contain inflationary pressure. Doyon, Rondeau, and Mbala  Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction   209 
 
 
Table 6. Average Price Submitted by Buyers as a Percentage of Their Induced Value (aggregated 
by model) 
Model A  Model B  Model C  All 
  kDA T-kDA kDA T-kDA kDA T-kDA  kDA  T-kDA 
  Mean  85.3 76.6 92.0 66.0 93.1  64.8  88.0  72.6 
  Median  91.4 79.3 95.8 71.7 97.2  65.4  93.3  76.0 
  Max.  107.7 130.8 100.0 100.0 108.3  100.0  108.3  130.8 
  Min.  5.0  6.0 13.1 16.7  5.4  24.7 5.0 6.0 
  Std.  Dev.  16.8 16.3 10.8 22.5 11.1  20.1  15.3  18.9 
  Obs.  560 616 168 168 168  168  896  952 




Figure 5. Average Price Submitted by Buyers as a Percentage of Their Induced Value (per period 
and per model) 





The truncated uniform price k-double auction has 
been shown to significantly reduce the market-
clearing price when compared to the standard uni-
form kDA. The reduction is brought about by a 
combination of the pricing rule based on extra-
marginal bids, and by significantly reducing buy-
ers’ bidding prices. It is particularly effective in 
extreme market conditions where sellers in a kDA 
normally have an advantage over buyers. The 
greatest effect of the truncated rule was felt under 210    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 7. Average Price Submitted by Sellers as a Percentage of their Induced Cost (aggregated 
by models) 
kDA  T-kDA 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
P-value 
(Mood test comparing medians) 
Model A  152%  106%  159%  106%  0.70 
Model B  267%  106%  174%  138%  0.31 
Model C  184%  107%  164%  128%  0.02 





Figure 6. Average Price Submitted by Sellers as a Percentage of their Induced Cost (per period 
and per model) 
Note: Periods 1 to 8 (Model A), periods 9 to 16 (Model B), and periods 17 to 24 (Model C). 
 
 
conditions that ought to be considered the most 
favorable to sellers: large excess demand and wide 
difference between the reserve prices of the mar-
ginal buyer and seller (Model B). In these condi-
tions, the truncated rule was able to dramatically 
reduce the ability of sellers to push the equilib-
rium price up. This is an important finding that 
could help devise better allocation rules in thin 
agricultural quota markets and in other sectors 
marked by excess demand and market power. 
  The reduction in market-clearing prices and the 
ability to mitigate market power among sellers 
come at a cost. This cost is a drop in the number 
of units transacted, and the sub-optimal allocation 
of some units to buyers who value them less than 
other excluded participants. These combined ef-
fects resulted in a loss of efficiency in the order 
of 15 percentage points in our experiment. 
  It might be possible to adopt other pricing rules 
to decrease the equilibrium price while avoiding 
significant efficiency losses by maintaining a nor-
mal allocation rule in which high-price buyers ob-
tain units first. Alone, the uniform transaction price 
based on the lowest extra-marginal bid above the Doyon, Rondeau, and Mbala  Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction   211 
 
 
normal crossing of demand and supply could still 
deliver downward pressure on the price. Simi-
larly, a lower k parameter could be implemented 
(making the price closer to the marginal seller’s 
ask). 
  Whether such measures can regularly deliver 
high efficiency and lower prices cannot be deter-
mined without additional experimentation since 
the pricing and allocation rules affect player 
behavior. However, two concerns deserve men-
tion. First, a uniform price auction in which high 
bids obtain the first units should remain incen-
tive-compatible. This suggests that bids would be 
similar to those observed in our control experi-
ment and remove one source of downward 
pressure on prices. In addition, the lack of incen-
tive to lower bids may provide enough room for 
sellers to increase their bids in situations like our 
Market B. 
  Since we can only speculate that providing in-
centives to lower bids plays a major role in our 
observed results, additional experimentation should 
be conducted in order to distinguish the role of 
the pricing rule from that of the order in which 
the units are allocated. 
  Our results compare advantageously with the 
modifications to the uniform price double auction 
market tested by Doyon et al. (2008). The best 
that Doyon et al. achieved was a 5 percent reduc-
tion in market-clearing price, with a reduction of 
50 percent in the number of units traded and a 52 
point reduction in efficiency. This contrasts sharply 
with our results in Model B, where a 51 percent 
reduction over the competitive market price is 
obtained in exchange for a reduction of roughly 4 
percent in the number of units traded and an 
efficiency loss of 15 percentage points. 
  Although efficiency losses are not as important 
here as they were in Doyon et al. (2008), they are 
significant. It is difficult to measure the long-term 
impact of this phenomenon. One could argue that 
if buyers’ bids are a reflection of their compara-
tive advantage, then the efficiency loss caused by 
the introduction of a T-kDA would reduce the 
long-term competitiveness of Québec’s egg pro-
duction sector. From the producers’ perspective, 
this might be acceptable. As a government-sanc-
tioned agricultural policy, however, the merits of 
this approach are debatable. As Cramton and Stoft 
(2007) point out for the U.S. energy sector, stan-
dard (single-sided) uniform price auctions gener-
ally provide the correct incentives to participants, 
and the resulting price acts as a strong signal of 
marginal value and costs. Moving to alternative 
institutions muddies this important signal and can 
jeopardize the long-term viability, stability, and 
efficiency of the industry. The T-kDA could have 
such effects. While a mechanism like the kDA 
rewards most efficient buyers, the truncation rule 
effectively rewards those buyers who are best 
able to predict the clearing price. Obviously, 
these need not be the same individuals, and it 
could follow that the resulting market prices will 
no longer reflect the fundamentals of the industry. 
  By construction, the T-kDA also has distribu-
tional consequences that favor buyers over sell-
ers. In our experiments, sellers captured 50.3 per-
cent of the realized gains from trade in kDAs, 
compared to 39.7 percent under the T-kDA. It 
might very well be that this kind of redistributive 
impact and the lower prices generated by the T-
kDA are positive indicators of the ability of the 
T-kDA to favor small and new entrants, and to 
limit the geographical concentration of the indus-
try. If so, the T-kDA might be effective at meet-
ing the secondary objectives of Québec’s egg 
producers. 
  So, while it is quite likely that the adoption of 
the truncated k-double auction in Québec’s egg 
industry (or any other centralized market mecha-
nism that evicts input suppliers from the quota 
trade) would represent a sizeable improvement 
over a system controlled by feed producers, few if 
any economists would enthusiastically recommend 
the broad adoption of such a mechanism. 
  Québec’s egg producers have the legal power 
(through a democratic process) to choose and im-
plement the quota allocation rules they wish to 
have. Current quota holders who stand to lose the 
most from the implementation of the T-kDA are 
in fact preparing for its deployment in Québec. 
Since they have received the information gathered 
in this research project, their decision to forge 
ahead with the mechanism must be taken as evi-
dence that they are deeply committed to maintain-
ing a low level of industry concentration despite 
the cost falling predominantly on them. 
  The actual implementation of the auction should 
provide exciting opportunities to analyze the be-
havior of actual buyers and sellers in the Québec 
egg quota market. Given that the egg industry 
(and many other such markets) is composed of a 
relatively small group of individuals potentially 
able to identify and communicate with other par-212    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
ticipants, future research could explore the effect 
of manipulating group size and whether allowing 
more explicit means of manipulating the market 
or colluding with other participants might affect 
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